Tia N.List

Reported by 3 outlets

Threat actors abuse ChatGPT custom GPTs to deliver RAT payloads via ClickFix-style attacks

hot0.4
Why this score
Breadth
1.50 / 2.0 · 3 sources
Authority
1.80 / 2.0 · best outlet weight
Severity
0.90 / 5.0 · CVSS + content signals
Velocity
0.00 / 2.0 · updates in 48h
Pickup speed
0.53 / 0.6 · time to second source
Recency
× 0.00 temporal multiplier
Community
+ 0.40 / 1.5 · reddit signal
Score
0.4 / 10 = base × recency + community
huntress.comcybersecuritynews.comsecurityweek.com desk first seen 15d ago

Desk analysis

Huntress documented a ClickFix campaign whose first stage runs on chatgpt.com itself. Two attacker-built Custom GPTs, both titled "Plus 5.6" and attributed to a "community builder", answered any prompt with a fake "Service Availability Notice" and a link to a Google Sites page (sites.google.com/view/antibot172881) dressed as a Cloudflare CAPTCHA. The victim who pastes the offered command runs PowerShell that pulls a stager from 1614733393, a decimal-IP spelling of 96.62.224[.]81, which silently installs a malicious MSI posing as "Advanced Printer Configuration Reader". The MSI sideloads patched Canon code, COTFileReadApp.exe loading a modified ceiinfolog.dll, then decodes a loader hidden inside a .wav file and unpacks a full-featured RAT from an encrypted custom archive, monitor.raw. Huntress counted at least 40 incidents tied to that Google Sites domain, two confirmed Custom GPT infections; OpenAI took the first GPT down on September 25 and a replacement was live by September 27.

The novelty is not the RAT, it is the address bar. Every early hop sits on infrastructure nobody blocks: the GPT URLs carried gad_source and gad_campaignid parameters, meaning victims arrived through paid Google ads placed above the organic results, then touched chatgpt.com and Google Sites, both reputation-gold. The first network indicator a filter can act on is the MSI fetch, which rides plain HTTP from a bare IP written in decimal, so dotted-IP URL rules never match. The payload is engineered to outlast an alert: a HKCU Run key rewritten every 150 seconds and a scheduled task every 875, AMSI bypass, ntdll unhooking, anti-VM checks, and C2 resolved over DNS-over-HTTPS through Cloudflare, Google and Quad9, so the "Gate" never appears in local DNS logs. Microsoft Defender did quarantine ISOSimple.msi as Trojan:Script/Wacatac.H!ml in one case, but only after the Run key and task had already taken over, which is the lesson: detection after installation is not containment here. Malicious DLLs were compiled 2026-09-24 22:46 UTC, one day before the first samples surfaced, and the delivery server already held a third installer on September 23. This is a maintained framework rotating costumes, not a one-off build.

Hunt by process lineage and persistence names, not hashes, because the V2 stager re-obfuscates per request. Alert on powershell.exe launching msiexec with /qn /norestart against a %TEMP% MSI named <32 hex characters>_ISOSimple.msi or IconEdit2Turb.msi; on COTFileReadApp.exe or the Stardock DeElevate64.exe running from %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\Advanced Printer Configuration Reader\ or %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool\; on an unsigned ceiinfolog.dll, rdCore.dll, WPFLocalizeExtension.dll or WMPCL.dll beside the Canon host, and in V2 on a DeElevator64.dll with a header-checksum mismatch plus I++u.dll, senddmp.resources.dll, res.dll or Build.dat. Any HKCU Run value or scheduled task named "Canon Configuration Reader" or "Stardock DeElevation Tool" is compromise until proven otherwise, and cleanup order matters: kill the process first, then remove both, or the implanted script restores them within minutes. Treat confirmed infections as full compromise: the RAT enumerates domain and domain-controller details, captures camera and microphone, drives 17 browser families, and dropped a legitimately signed GOMCam2024.exe from %LOCALAPPDATA%\AppstorageFile\ in the investigated cases. Flag outbound HTTP to bare decimal-IP URLs and alert when non-browser processes reach DoH resolvers.

Two developments would change this assessment. The third MSI on the same server, UltraFreeISOCreateWizardSolution.msi seen September 23, says a further signed-host variant is pre-staged, so Canon and Stardock name detections will age out fast and the durable signature is behavioral: msiexec installing a fake product under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs, plus a Run key and task sharing one name that regenerate after deletion. The other is platform response: if OpenAI adds review friction or provenance signals to Custom GPTs, or Google polices sponsored ads pointing at GPT pages, the delivery economics collapse; if neither happens, expect copycats on other agent marketplaces and watch for the RAT's C2 "Gate" surfacing as other researchers finish unpacking it.

Timeline

  1. original reporting

    (huntress.com) Threat Actors Exploit ChatGPT Custom GPTs to Deliver Malicious Payloads via ClickFix-Style Attacks In brief - This article de

    www.huntress.com · 15d ago · September 28th, 2026

    (huntress.com) Threat Actors Exploit ChatGPT Custom GPTs to Deliver Malicious Payloads via ClickFix-Style Attacks In brief - This article de

    via Mastodon https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat

  2. update from www.huntress.com

    New: Attackers are abusing ChatGPT's Custom GPT feature, luring victims in w/ the legit ChatGPT domain and then directing them to a ClickFix

    www.huntress.com · 15d ago · September 28th, 2026

    New: Attackers are abusing ChatGPT's Custom GPT feature, luring victims in w/ the legit ChatGPT domain and then directing them to a ClickFix

    via X https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat

  3. update from securityweek.com

    Hackers Use ChatGPT Custom GPTs in ClickFix Attacks

    securityweek.com · 14d ago · September 29th, 2026

    A newly discovered ClickFix campaign is relying on ChatGPT Custom GPTs to impersonate legitimate products and lure victims into executing malicious code on their machines. Custom GPTs are personalized versions of ChatGPT that may include specific instructions and tools. They are hosted on ChatGPT.com, and their pages feature their custom names at the top, along with the builder’s profile. As part of the malicious campaign, a threat actor programmed two Custom GPTs to respond to users’ prompts with a Google Sites link leading to a ClickFix page, cybersecurity firm Huntress reports . On this page, visitors were instructed to execute PowerShell commands that downloaded a malicious MSI file as part of a multi-stage infection chain. According to Huntress, at least 40 users have been infected as part of the campaign, and at least two of the incidents are connected to a Custom GPT instance. OpenAI took down the Custom GPT on September 25, but a second one was discovered on September 27. “Threat actors are finding success in this specific abuse of Custom GPTs for social engineering and are continuing to rely on this technique,” Huntress notes. The victims accessed the Custom GPT after searching for ChatGPT on Google and being served the page as a sponsored result at the top of the search results. To trick the victims, the attackers titled the Custom GPT “Plus 5.6” and claimed it was from a “community builder”. The user received a fake notice

  4. mentioned by cybersecuritynews.com

    Attackers Abuse Custom GPTs in ClickFix Campaign https:// cybersecuritynews.com/chatgpt-custom -gpt-malware/ … Attackers are abusing ChatGPT

    cybersecuritynews.com · 14d ago · September 29th, 2026

Covered in

digest 2026-09-30

Source on GitHub