Reported by 2 outlets
Seedworm (MuddyWater) expands global espionage — abuses signed Fortemedia and SentinelOne binaries for DLL sideloading
Why this score
- Breadth
- 1.00 / 2.0 · 2 sources
- Authority
- 1.80 / 2.0 · best outlet weight
- Severity
- 0.80 / 5.0 · CVSS + content signals
- Velocity
- 0.00 / 2.0 · updates in 48h
- Pickup speed
- 0.00 / 0.6 · time to second source
- Recency
- × 0.00 temporal multiplier
- Community
- + 0.00 / 1.5 · reddit signal
- Score
- 0.0 / 10 = base × recency + community
Timeline
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original reporting
Seedworm (MuddyWater) expands global espionage — abuses signed Fortemedia and SentinelOne binaries for DLL sideloading
bleepingcomputer.com · 153d ago · May 14th, 2026
Symantec has documented a broad Seedworm campaign targeting at least nine organizations across government, manufacturing, finance, aviation, and education sectors on four continents. The campaign centers on a week-long intrusion into a major South Korean electronics manufacturer in February 2026, during which the Iranian MOIS-linked group spent seven days performing reconnaissance, credential theft via fake Windows prompts and registry hive extraction, and persistent access through registry modifications and 90-second beacon intervals. The group's tooling has evolved: rather than direct PowerShell execution, payloads are now controlled through Node.js loaders. Most notably, Seedworm abused legitimate signed binaries — Fortemedia's
fmapp.exeaudio utility and SentinelOne'ssentinelmemoryscanner.exe— to sideload malicious DLLs (fmapp.dllandsentinelagentcore.dll) containing the ChromElevator post-exploitation tool for Chrome-based data theft. Data exfiltration usessendit.sh, a public file-sharing service, to blend with legitimate traffic. -
update from cyberpress.org
Seedworm (MuddyWater) Weaponizes Signed SentinelOne and Fortemedia Binaries in Global Espionage Campaign
cyberpress.org · 140d ago · May 27th, 2026
Iran-linked Seedworm (MuddyWater / Static Kitten, operating under MOIS) breached a major South Korean electronics manufacturer as part of a sprawling early-2026 campaign spanning government agencies, airports, financial services, and industrial manufacturers across four continents — signaling a broadened intelligence-gathering mandate beyond the Middle East. The campaign demonstrates significantly matured tradecraft. Attackers deployed DLL sideloading via validly signed third-party executables:
fmapp.exe(Fortemedia Audio Utilities) loaded a maliciousfmapp.dll, andsentinelmemoryscanner.exe— a signed SentinelOne security binary — loadedsentinelagentcore.dll. Both deployed ChromElevator, a publicly available post-exploitation tool for extracting browser passwords, cookies, and payment data from Chromium-based browsers. Seedworm shifted from heavy PowerShell usage to Node.js-based automation, withnode.exeobserved as the grandparent process for hijacked binaries — indicating automated loader infrastructure rather than hands-on-keyboard operation. Credential theft targeted SAM/SECURITY/SYSTEM hives for NTLM hashes and specialized tools for Kerberos TGT extraction. Exfiltration used sendit.sh, a public file-transfer service, blending stolen data with normal consumer cloud traffic.