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Operation Highland — Velvet Ant Chinese APT Hijacks Authentication Stack, Spies on Air-Gapped Critical Infrastructure Network for 10 Years

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bleepingcomputer.com first seen 122d ago

Timeline

  1. original reporting

    Operation Highland — Velvet Ant Chinese APT Hijacks Authentication Stack, Spies on Air-Gapped Critical Infrastructure Network for 10 Years

    bleepingcomputer.com · 122d ago · June 14th, 2026

    Chinese hackers of the Velvet Ant cluster breached an isolated critical infrastructure network and maintained undetected access for a decade (2016–2026) by hijacking the organization's entire authentication infrastructure. Dubbed "Operation Highland" by Sygnia researchers, the intrusion represents one of the longest known persistent compromises of a truly air-gapped environment.

    The attack chain began with the compromise of internet-facing servers, deploying a modified GS-Netcat reverse shell disguised as a legitimate system component, with persistence via malicious systemd services or startup scripts. A custom SOCKS5 proxy masquerading as smbd -D turned compromised servers into internal pivot points.

    The most sophisticated element: Velvet Ant modified a compromised internet-facing Nginx server to proxy specially crafted HTTP POST requests through a FastCGI wrapper (fcgiwrap) into the isolated network — establishing a remote-execution bridge with no direct connection to the critical infrastructure environment. Inside, they:

    • Replaced pam_unix.so with 9 distinct backdoored variants — each compiled in a separate build environment, indicating a well-resourced operation — accepting hardcoded passwords and harvesting user credentials

    • Trojanized OpenSSH components (ssh, sshd, scp) to capture credentials and log SSH session commands

    • Achieved persistence immune to password changes and session terminations, with full visibility into every administrative login and command

    Cleanup complexity: Remediation required building a dedicated testing lab to validate binary replacement — removing tampered authentication components risked locking legitimate administrators out entirely.

    Recommendation: Treat PAM, OpenSSH, and LSASS as critical security assets. Deploy file integrity monitoring, hardened privileged access, and offline recovery procedures with immutable backup snapshots.


Covered in

digest 2026-06-14

Source on GitHub