Reported by 6 outlets
Misconfigured Supabase apps expose data in over 16,000 databases
Why this score
- Breadth
- 2.00 / 2.0 · 6 sources
- Authority
- 1.80 / 2.0 · best outlet weight
- Severity
- 1.70 / 5.0 · CVSS + content signals
- Velocity
- 0.00 / 2.0 · updates in 48h
- Pickup speed
- 0.00 / 0.6 · time to second source
- Recency
- × 0.00 temporal multiplier
- Community
- + 0.00 / 1.5 · reddit signal
- Score
- 0.0 / 10 = base × recency + community
Desk analysis
UpGuard's September 25, 2026 study put a number on a pattern researchers have been documenting since March 2025: 16,326 Supabase databases out of roughly 300,000 domains showing Supabase fingerprints serve readable tables to anyone who asks. There is no bug to exploit and no CVE for the class; the client ships a public anon or publishable key by design, and the tables behind it either lack row-level security policies or carry policies that restrict nothing, so a plain GET against the /rest/v1/ endpoint returns full rows. Over half the exposed databases held PII, a smaller subset passwords and authentication tokens, and a very small set plausible credit card data. CVE-2025-48757 named the Lovable-flavored variant of this misconfiguration back in May 2025, and UpGuard's finding is the same failure mode grown to platform scale, now mixed across standalone businesses rather than one builder's output.
The exposure is a breach without an intrusion, and the victim set is defined by one adoption curve: AI-assisted development accounts for more than 60 percent of newly created Supabase databases, yet Supabase's own January 2026 security retro confirms RLS-by-default applies only to tables created in the dashboard, not to tables created programmatically through the API, which is exactly how coding agents like Claude Code build. The platform's growth engine therefore routes through the one path that still ships tables open by default, and the humans involved, in UpGuard's words, do not understand their database's configuration. The readable payloads convert directly into follow-on compromise: 884 plaintext passwords at a Canadian immigration service, over 100,000 customer records with license plates and visit history at a US valet company, 25,000 consulate records with emergency housing locations, and 1.5 million API tokens at Moltbook in February 2026. Credentials and tokens harvested this way feed account takeover at entirely unrelated services, which is why this story outranks the day's ordinary breach news.
Nothing gets patched here; the fix is configuration. Enable RLS on every table in the exposed schema or disable the Data API outright, audit policies for correctness rather than mere existence, and rotate legacy JWT-based anon and service_role keys to revocable publishable and secret keys before Supabase removes legacy keys in late 2026. Run Supabase Security Advisors, act on the email alerts for tables without RLS, and review the platform's advisors documentation and API security guide that BleepingComputer's report points to. The hunt is cheap: pull the JavaScript bundles of sites you own or assess and grep for supabase.co hostnames and sb_publishable or anon key strings, then replay a select=* query against rest/v1/ tables with that public key and treat any returned row as a finding. PostgREST error hints that name accessible tables are the same tell UpGuard and Wiz used, and web logs showing unauthenticated GETs to /rest/v1/ with large row counts are evidence someone else is harvesting.
Two developments would change this assessment. First, credential-stuffing telemetry tying the harvested password and token sets to account takeover waves at major providers would move the story from hygiene problem to active incident. Second, Supabase extending RLS-by-default to API-created tables or accelerating legacy key revocation would shrink the exposed population faster than manual cleanup, while any follow-up research quantifying active harvesting of these 16,326 databases would confirm the second half of the kill chain is already running.
Timeline
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original reporting
Misconfigured Supabase apps expose data in over 16,000 databases
bleepingcomputer.com · 15d ago · September 28th, 2026
Researchers found more than 16,000 misconfigured Supabase databases exposing readable tables with personally identifiable information, passwords, or authentication tokens. Based on the analysis of table schemas, researchers at cyber risk management company UpGuard believe that a very small set of the exposed information includes credit card data. Supabase is an open-source development platform built around PostgreSQL that provides developers with a range of backend services to build and launch apps and websites faster. The service has become increasingly popular among developers using artificial intelligence tools to build projects, with AI-assisted development accounting for more than 60% of newly created databases. UpGuard researchers analyzed a dataset of around 300,000 domains that showed signs of using Supabase and checked for a 'users' table. While some queries returned a page from the database, others hinted that the 'users' table did not exist, but a table with another name was accessible. The researchers then used the table schemas to infer the data types exposed across the set. In more than half of the exposed databases, UpGuard found personally identifiable information (PII), with a smaller subset including passwords and authentication tokens. Exposed data types Source: UpGuard Among the more notable findings was a U.S. valet service that exposed more than 100,000 customer records, including contact details, license plates, and visit history. At a Canadian immigrat
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update from mattpalmer.io
Statement on CVE-2025-48757
mattpalmer.io · 503d ago · May 29th, 2025
Matt Palmer's disclosure statement documents the original researcher finding of systemic Row Level Security misconfiguration in Lovable-built apps backed by Supabase, first discovered March 20, 2025. A scan completed March 21, 2025 found 303 exposed endpoints across 170 of 1,645 showcase projects, about 10.3 percent, and the CVE was published May 29, 2025 after a 45-day window with a CVSS v3.1 vector of AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N. The statement also records public exploitation of the same flaw on April 14, 2025.
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update from supabase.com
Supabase Security Retro: 2025
supabase.com · 280d ago · January 7th, 2026
Supabase CISO Bil Harmer and CEO Paul Copplestone review 2025 platform security changes. RLS is enabled by default only for tables created via the dashboard Table Editor, not for tables created programmatically, and Event Triggers plus email alerts and Security Advisors were added to detect tables without RLS. New revocable publishable and secret API keys replace legacy JWT-based anon and service_role keys, which will be removed in late 2026, and the post states application-level security remains each customer's responsibility.
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update from wiz.io
Hacking Moltbook: The AI Social Network Any Human Can Control
wiz.io · 254d ago · February 2nd, 2026
Wiz Research disclosed a misconfigured Supabase database behind Moltbook, a social network for AI agents, that granted unauthenticated read and write access to all platform data. The exposure included 1.5 million API authentication tokens, 35,000 email addresses, private messages, and roughly 4.75 million records; the maintainer applied fixes within hours of contact starting January 31, 2026. The post describes the recurring pattern of Supabase keys in client-side JavaScript without RLS in vibe-coded applications.
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update from thehackernews.com
What 2,000 Exposed Vibe-Coded Apps Reveal About the Limits of Most Security Stacks
thehackernews.com · 138d ago · May 29th, 2026
The Hacker News covered Red Access's Shadow Builders report, which identified more than 380,000 publicly accessible web assets across leading vibe-coding platforms. Roughly 5,000 looked corporate and more than 2,000 exposed sensitive corporate, operational, or personal data with no exploitation required. The piece argues EDR, DLP, and CASB miss these applications because the risk sits in the gaps between those control layers.
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update from upguard.com
Everything Everywhere: Systemic Data Exposure in Supabase Apps
upguard.com · 19d ago · September 25th, 2026
The report attributes exposure to missing or ineffective row-level security and misuse of public keys, and notes tables created programmatically through the API do not enable RLS by default. UpGuard notified application owners where deeper analysis found significant exposure.
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update from www.bleepingcomputer.com
Misconfigured Supabase apps expose data in over 16,000 databases https:// bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ misconfigured-supabase-apps-ex
www.bleepingcomputer.com · 15d ago · September 28th, 2026
Misconfigured Supabase apps expose data in over 16,000 databases https:// bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ misconfigured-supabase-apps-ex
via X https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/misconfigured-supabase-apps-expose-data-in-over-16-000-databases/
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mentioned by www.bleepingcomputer.com
🤖 Researchers found 16,000+ misconfigured Supabase databases exposing readable tables with PII, passwords and authentication tokens — open t
www.bleepingcomputer.com · 15d ago · September 28th, 2026
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mentioned by www.bleepingcomputer.com
🤖 Researchers found 16,000+ misconfigured Supabase databases exposing readable tables with PII, passwords and auth tokens — mostly missing R
www.bleepingcomputer.com · 15d ago · September 29th, 2026