Reported by 1 outlet
Ivanti Sentry Max Severity RCE + Auth Bypass (CVE-2026-10520 CVSS 10.0, CVE-2026-10523 CVSS 9.9)
Why this score
- Breadth
- 0.50 / 2.0 · 1 source
- Authority
- 1.80 / 2.0 · best outlet weight
- Severity
- 5.00 / 5.0 · CVSS + KEV signals
- Velocity
- 0.00 / 2.0 · updates in 48h
- Pickup speed
- 0.22 / 0.6 · time to second source
- Recency
- × 0.00 temporal multiplier
- Community
- + 0.00 / 1.5 · reddit signal
- Score
- 0.0 / 10 = base × recency + community
Desk analysis
Ivanti Sentry secure mobile gateways (formerly MobileIron Sentry) carry two maximum-severity flaws patched June 9: CVE-2026-10520 (CVSS 10.0) is an unauthenticated OS command injection giving root-level remote code execution through a crafted request, and CVE-2026-10523 (CVSS 9.9) is an authentication bypass allowing attackers to create rogue admin accounts. The same advisory covered high-severity EPMM bugs (CVE-2026-6973, CVE-2026-10727) enabling authenticated RCE via arbitrary Apache directives and root command execution, plus Fortinet patched CVE-2026-25089 (CVSS 9.8), an unauthenticated OS command injection in FortiSandbox WEB UI. No vendor advisory acknowledges active exploitation yet, but Shadowserver telemetry and CISA's KEV entry contradict that silence.
The distinction here is not the bug class but the speed and scale of confirmed exploitation. Shadowserver found 19 vulnerable Sentry instances in scans, with at least 2 already backdoored, and warned that unpatched systems are most likely compromised; attackers began backdooring exposed instances within 24 hours of the June 9 release, driven by a public PoC. Only about 50 Sentry admin portals remain visible to scanners because the rest are blocklisted, which means the real exposed population is larger and harder to assess. CISA added CVE-2026-10520 to KEV on Thursday under BOD 26-04, making it the first vulnerability covered by the new risk-based directive and requiring federal agencies to patch within three days. With 34 Ivanti CVEs already flagged as actively exploited, the combined chain of unauthenticated root RCE plus admin account creation on a mobile-access gateway is not a theoretical risk; it is a confirmed compromise vector for every reachable Sentry instance.
Rebuild any exposed Sentry instance from known-good firmware rather than trusting a patch alone, because Shadowserver's assessment implies active root-level persistence. Verify admin accounts for unauthorized creation tied to CVE-2026-10523, and restrict access to the admin portal at the network boundary. Hunt for exploitation attempts matching the public PoC and log anomalies associated with crafted requests targeting the Sentry gateway. Update EPMM installations and FortiSandbox systems as part of the same maintenance cycle, since the advisory bundles multiple root-level RCE paths across Ivanti's product line.
Watch for Ivanti updating its advisory to acknowledge active exploitation, which would confirm what Shadowserver and CISA already indicate. Monitor Shadowserver for updated scan counts beyond the 19 vulnerable and 2 backdoored instances reported, as additional exposure would shift the risk calculus for enterprises running blocklisted gateways.
Timeline
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original reporting
Ivanti Sentry Max Severity RCE + Auth Bypass (CVE-2026-10520 CVSS 10.0, CVE-2026-10523 CVSS 9.9)
bleepingcomputer.com · 126d ago · June 10th, 2026
Ivanti patched two critical vulnerabilities in its Sentry secure mobile gateway (formerly MobileIron Sentry): an OS command injection (CVE-2026-10520, CVSS 10.0) allowing unauthenticated remote code execution as root, and an authentication bypass (CVE-2026-10523, CVSS 9.9) enabling unauthenticated attackers to create rogue admin accounts.
Additionally, Ivanti patched two high-severity EPMM flaws (CVE-2026-6973, CVE-2026-10727) enabling authenticated RCE via arbitrary Apache directives and root command execution. Fortinet simultaneously patched CVE-2026-25089 (CVSS 9.8), an unauthenticated OS command injection in FortiSandbox WEB UI. No evidence of exploitation for any of these four flaws. Ivanti products have been a frequent zero-day target — treat these patches as urgent preventive maintenance.
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update from bleepingcomputer.com
Ivanti Sentry CVE-2026-10520 (CVSS 10.0) — Patched Tuesday, Exploited Wednesday, Most Exposed Instances Already Backdoored
bleepingcomputer.com · 125d ago · June 11th, 2026
Just one day after Ivanti released patches for a maximum-severity OS command injection in Sentry secure mobile gateways, the Shadowserver Foundation reported that attackers had already backdoored virtually every reachable exposed instance. Shadowserver identified 19 vulnerable instances in its scans, with at least 2 confirmed backdoored, and noted "if you have not patched now you are most likely compromised" — Ivanti's own advisory still states "no evidence of exploitation at time of disclosure" as of this writing. Prior context (June 10): Ivanti patched CVE-2026-10520 on Tuesday alongside an auth bypass (CVE-2026-10523, CVSS 9.9). CISA has flagged 34 Ivanti CVEs as actively exploited. Every exposed Sentry instance should be treated as compromised — rebuild from known-good firmware.
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update from bleepingcomputer.com
Ivanti Sentry CVE-2026-10520 (CVSS 10.0) — CISA KEV, First Vulnerability Subject to BOD 26-04's 3-Day Deadline, Most Exposed Instances Likely Compromised
bleepingcomputer.com · 124d ago · June 12th, 2026
CISA added the actively exploited Ivanti Sentry OS command injection to its KEV catalog on Thursday and ordered federal agencies to patch within three days under the newly issued BOD 26-04 — making CVE-2026-10520 the first vulnerability subject to the new risk-based directive. Shadowserver reports "a large amount of exploitation attempts based on the public PoC" and warns that systems not already patched are "most likely compromised." Only ~50 Sentry admin portals remain detectable; many more are likely blocklisted from public scanning. Attackers began backdooring exposed instances within 24 hours. The combined exploit chain gives unauthenticated root RCE + admin account creation.