Reported by 2 outlets

Timeline

1. original reporting

   Chinese-Speaking Hackers Use Claude, Qwen and DeepSeek AI Agents to Attack Government Systems

   gbhackers.com · 39d ago · September 4th, 2026

   Chinese-speaking threat operators have been observed using Claude, Qwen and DeepSeek-powered AI agents as operational components in a second intrusion campaign targeting government, political, education and industrial organizations across Asia. The campaign is distinct from an earlier operation reported in July that used Claude Code and DeepSeek against government and financial-sector targets. In this newer […] The post Chinese-Speaking Hackers Use Claude, Qwen and DeepSeek AI Agents to Attack Government Systems appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform .

2. update from cyberpress.org

   Hackers Use Claude, Qwen and DeepSeek AI Agents to Attack Government Networks

   cyberpress.org · 39d ago · September 4th, 2026

   The activity is separate from an earlier campaign involving Chinese-speaking operators, but shows a similar pattern: commercial AI models were used as operational tools during real intrusions. The actors targeted Taiwan’s Kuomintang Party History Archives, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, government systems in mainland China, and industrial organizations in Vietnam. Researchers linked five exposed attacker workspaces by tracing a shared SOCKS proxy endpoint . The infrastructure contained SecFlow, an AI orchestration framework that assigned reconnaissance, exploitation, data collection, and reporting tasks to specialized AI workers. AI Agents Attack Governments SecFlow allowed operators to switch between Claude, Qwen, and DeepSeek models without changing the task workflow. The agents received target details, proxy routes, tools, shared storage, and reporting instructions. The AI models did not independently compromise systems. Instead, they helped organize and automate conventional offensive activity, including vulnerability scanning, credential testing, exploitation attempts, webshell deployment, evidence collection, and report generation. Hunt.io AttackCapture page for 152.42.200[.]25 (Source: hunt.io) The recovered environment included workflows for Shellshock, Spring4Shell, Ghostcat, Apache Shiro deserialization , Log4Shell, Grafana path traversal, Nexus path traversal, and a Nacos authentication bypass. Researchers observed eight CVEs in active attack workflows.