Reported by 1 outlet
Cavern Manticore: Iran MOIS Deploys Modular "Cavern" C2 Framework Against Israeli IT Providers
Why this score
- Breadth
- 0.50 / 2.0 · 1 source
- Authority
- 1.80 / 2.0 · best outlet weight
- Severity
- 0.50 / 5.0 · CVSS + content signals
- Velocity
- 0.00 / 2.0 · updates in 48h
- Pickup speed
- 0.00 / 0.6 · time to second source
- Recency
- × 0.00 temporal multiplier
- Community
- + 0.00 / 1.5 · reddit signal
- Score
- 0.0 / 10 = base × recency + community
Timeline
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original reporting
Cavern Manticore: Iran MOIS Deploys Modular "Cavern" C2 Framework Against Israeli IT Providers
thehackernews.com · 98d ago · July 8th, 2026
Check Point Research has disclosed a new Iran-linked APT cluster, Cavern Manticore, affiliated with Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), deploying a previously undocumented modular C2 framework called Cavern (aka Cav3rn). The group shares tactical overlap with MuddyWater and Lyceum (assessed as a subgroup of OilRig).
The attack chain exploits SysAid's software update feature for DLL side-loading, deploying a trojanized
uxtheme.dllcontaining the Cavern Agent. The agent then fetches five post-exploitation DLL modules over HTTPS/WebSocket fromhospitalinstallation[.]com:-
mhm.dll — File operations, recursive search, archive handling, bidirectional transfer
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db.dll — SQL database enumeration, query, export, manipulation
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ode.dll — Active Directory reconnaissance, user/group enumeration, LDAP brute-force
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n-ten.dll — Network reconnaissance, port scanning, SMB brute-force
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n-sws.dll — SOCKS5 proxy and WebSocket tunneling
Notably, Cavern Manticore chains trusted IT provider relationships — compromising an initial IT services company, pivoting to a second-hop provider, then reaching the intended target. The actor abuses RMM tools and browser-based remote desktop (leveraging features like remote printing to exfiltrate data when clipboard and file-transfer controls are blocked). The framework uses three .NET compilation formats (.NET Framework, Mixed-Mode C++/CLI, and Native AOT) as an anti-analysis measure, with per-module AppDomain isolation for anti-forensics.
Hunting hypothesis: An attacker exploits a SysAid software update mechanism to side-load a trojanized DLL, then uses the Cavern C2 framework to pivot through IT service providers into target networks via compromised RMM tools.
Recommended action: Hunt for SysAid DLL side-loading indicators. Audit RMM tool access logs for lateral movement between customer environments. Monitor for C2 domain
hospitalinstallation[.]comand related IoCs. -