CTI · reviewed · 2026-09-30

Threat actors abuse ChatGPT custom GPTs to deliver RAT payloads via ClickFix-style attacks

Full story & timeline

Actors

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Malware / tools

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Campaigns

Custom GPT ClickFix

CVEs

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Victim sectors

technology

Geography

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MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Execution
T1086 PowerShell Execution
T1060 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Persistence
T1053 Scheduled Task/Job Execution
T1562 Impair Defenses Stealth

Indicators

No curated indicators tied to this case.

Detections

Detection content derived from this case analysis. Status: experimental — not validated against live telemetry.

Sigma raw

title: Custom GPT ClickFix RAT Install - Silent MSI or Signed Sideload Host From ProgramData Programs
id: 6097dc39-46b0-4b5f-8ef4-b6a3119a19bf
status: experimental
description: 'Detects execution markers of the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix RAT chain documented by Huntress: powershell.exe launching a silent msiexec install of the RAT MSI, or the Canon-signed COTFileReadApp.exe / Stardock-signed DeElevate64.exe sideload hosts running from %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs (Advanced Printer Configuration Reader or Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool).'
references:
  - https://www.huntress.com/blog/chatgpt-custom-gpts-clickfix-rat
  - https://www.securityweek.com/hackers-use-chatgpt-custom-gpts-in-clickfix-attacks/
author: Tia N. List
date: 2026-09-30
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1204
  - attack.t1059
  - attack.t1086
  - attack.t1060
  - attack.t1053
  - attack.t1562
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_psi_silent_msi:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
    Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - '/qn'
      - '/norestart'
  selection_sideload_host:
    Image|contains: '\Programs\'
    Image|endswith:
      - '\COTFileReadApp.exe'
      - '\DeElevate64.exe'
  condition: selection_psi_silent_msi or selection_sideload_host
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate silent MSI deployments driven by administrative PowerShell wrappers
  - Genuine Canon or Stardock software installed under a custom path containing Programs
level: high

References

Source on GitHub