CTI · corroborated · 2026-08-21
Microsoft-Signed Defender Driver Weaponized to Disable EDR and Antivirus
Actors
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Malware / tools
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Campaigns
BTR.sys weaponization / Living-off-the-Land driver abuse
CVEs
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Victim sectors
Enterprise
Geography
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MITRE ATT&CK
Indicators
No curated indicators tied to this case.
Detections
Detection content derived from this case analysis. Status: experimental — not validated against live telemetry.
Sigma raw
title: Microsoft Defender BTR.sys Driver Abuse for EDR Bypass
id: c9e5a3f6-0d4b-4e8f-b7a2-3f9c6d0e4b8a
status: experimental
description: >
Detects suspicious deployment of BTR.sys, the Microsoft Defender Boot-Time
Removal driver, outside normal Defender remediation flows. Check Point Research
and Jiri Vinopal (Aug 2026) disclosed how this legitimate Microsoft-signed
driver can be weaponized to perform kernel-level file and registry operations
before EDR products initialize, enabling arbitrary file deletion and defense
evasion.
references:
- https://cyberpress.org/microsoft-signed-defender-driver-weaponized/
- https://gbhackers.com/windows-defender-driver-abuse-enables-edr-bypass/
author: Tia N. List
date: 2026/08/21
tags:
- attack.t1089
- attack.t1562
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_driver:
Image|endswith:
- '\BTR.sys'
- '\btr.sys'
selection_resource:
Image|endswith: '\MpEngine.dll'
CommandLine|contains: 'BOOTTIMETOOL'
condition: selection_driver or selection_resource
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Microsoft Defender remediation deploying BTR.sys during scheduled scans
- Defender maintenance operations extracting the BOOTTIMETOOL resource
level: high